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Aerial Recon Behind Enemy Lines

Quick index:
Peacetime spy photos handed over to Germans | Aimo E. Juhola photographed Leningrad spewing Ack-Ack | Additional information | Credits]


INTRODUCTION

These articles were first published in the daily newspaper "Keskisuomalainen" on May 3, 2002 and October 30, 1998.
Published on these pages with the author's permission.

Translation to English language: Lt(jg) Markku Herd, Finnish Navy.
 

  
  
Peacetime spy photos handed over to Germans


Armas Eskola: Lentäminen oli välttämätöntä
Published by Karisto 1969
Different phases of Finnish military aviation from the 20s forwards.
Author: Juhana Lepoluoto
Originally published in the daily newspaper "Keskisuomalainen" on May 3, 2002.

Details of 1939 photography missions directed by Armas Eskola revealed only now

The big, still unanswered question: were the Soviets aware of the intelligence cooperation?

On the May Day eve of 1939, when peace still reigned in Europe, Armas Eskola's twin engine Bristol Blenheim took off from the Immola airbase on a secret mission to the Soviet airspace. The aircraft was of the same "short nosed" type that Eskola had delivered from Filton, England, since 1936. Eskola's detailed description of those peacetime recon flights is published only now, in the book "Jatkosodan kaukopartiolennot", collected and partly written by Kavo Laurila. (Published by Koala Kustannus, 2002)

"The first flight was probably done by German request," Eskola pondered.

According to him, the General Headquarters had German experts teaching the Finns the interpretation of stereo photographs. As a reward the Finns seem to have received intelligence-gathering equipment, including excellent aerial cameras. The British Eagle cameras used earlier had proven to be untrustworthy, especially at high altitudes.

After the break of the Winter War, many military personnel heard of the peacetime flights. The secret came out three years ago, revealed by the retired Colonel Jyri Paulaharju who collected an exhibit depicting wartime aerial recon.

Until today, the cooperation with Germans had remained in the dark.

Somersaults over Aunus

The first flight was done to the main base of the Red Navy in Kronstadt, over the Estonian coast, to Leningrad, at the altitude of 7,300 meters (24,300 ft). The camera took photos all the way and captured the Soviet Navy's preparations for the May Day parade on film.

Over 20 recon flights were done by August 1939, 13 of which were productive. The targets were the airbases east of Lake Ladoga, the shores of Lake Onega (Äänisjärvi) and the region of Petroskoy.

One of these flights caused a strict note that demanded punitive action against the crew of a Finnish place with BL registry. Eskola's voice is rife with irony as he tells how the search for guilty party began in Kauhava, and not until just before Winter War there was any idea of the culprit.

The hose of the pilot's oxygen mask had come off unnoticed and he had passed out. The plane did weird maneuvers over the city of Aunus. The photographer, Staff Sergeant Oinonen, couldn't reach his parachute because the photographing equipment filled the machine gun turret.

Another time trouble came on the Finnish side: the motor of the camera quit because of faulty valve springs. The pilot had to fly low to the Frontier Guard airbase at Onttola and face an angry Colonel. Colonel Erkki Raappana calmed down after hearing what was going on.

Even a general was looking for culprit

On the second day of the Winter War, December 1, 1939, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, General J.F.Lundqvist, came to Luonetjärvi, Tikkakoski, and showed the staff HQ "a terribly big bunch of photographs we had taken", as Eskola put it. According to the General, the time of secrets was over. Early '41 Eskola was called for a hearing. The C-in-C had given an order to begin investigations on the revealed recon flights. Eskola strictly refused any kinds of interrogations.

After the Continuation War Lundqvist, a known anglophile, was made the Chief of Defence. President Juho Kusti Paasikivi however relieved him of the duty, when Lundqvist attempted to do services to the allied Watch Commission, that weren't even requested. Lundqvist wanted to make quick purges in the Defence Forces by forcing high officers to retire.

Lundqvist's reputation is uneasy, and no one thinks the former artillery officer as any kind of expert on air war.

Did the Soviets know?

There is material concerning Finns in In the so-called Venona papers, deciphered Soviet intelligence messages that the U.S. National Security Agency published. According to them, Soviet Union had informants in high levels of Finnish government and military.

Soviet military intelligence was in disorder before Winter Was, as its creator Jan Berzin had lost his life in Stalin's purges. Earlier Berzin's organization had revealed the secret cooperation between Finland and Estonia to close the Gulf of Finland, with the help of their agent, photographer Lieutenant Vilho Pentikäinen.

It is known that the Finnish Blenheim programme was a special interest of the Soviet intelligence, and the bombers were targeted for sabotage. There may be no reason to suspect, though, that the fault in the vent springs in Eskola's plane was deliberate.

But if the dictator government of Josif Stalin, fervent in its paranoid hunt of saboteurs, got a hint of Finnish spy flights from a reliable, high-ranking source, it may have affected the coming events.

The pilot of the recon flights, ret. Lieutenant Colonel Armas Eskola, met his surviving colleagues in the aviation museum of Tikkakoski in 1989.

During the flights, Armas Eskola's rank was Captain.


There's interesting discussion of the topic in the Third Reich Forum, some of which quoted below::
Did anyone saw article from Etelä-Suomen Sanomat 17.11 "Suomalaiset Leningradin taivaalla kesällä 1939" (Finns in the Leningrad sky in summer 1939). It tells about several(23 if I remember correct) missions where Bristol Blendheim plane with 3 crew members flew over and photographed Leningrad, Kronstad, and southern beach of gulf of Finland. Germany used same region in their attack to Leningrad in 1941. Only few people knew about these missions and no one still knows who neened these pictures. Captain Armas Eskola who flew all 23 missions believes that Germany was behind it...

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This is the first time I have seen this information. Sounds a bit far fetched that FAF would have done photographing flights on German account in 1939. More plausible reason would be own security needs. The situation in Europe was already getting tense and photographic information, or spying if the planes flew over Soviet territory, could have revealled any troop concentrations on the Soviet side of the Finnish and Estonian borders. Strength and location of the Soviet Baltic Fleet would probably also have been of interest. If there was any co-operation with some other nation, I would guess it was Estonia. Especially given the recently published study on Finnish-Estonian co-operation in coastal defence.

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I have also red about these flights. They are well described in Kavo Laurila's book about Finnish long-range patrol pilots (published in 2002) and also in the book(s) of Joppe Karhunen. These stories are written/told by Capt. Eskola himself so they should be reliable.

Eskola says that he saw German officials at Helsinki in the FAF Staff. Finns also received new Zeiss cameras from Germany for these missions, so it is more than likely that this photography operation was mutual Finnish-German one. Why these regions were photographed is another thing, but it is always good to know what is behind the frontier because situation was becoming "hotter" all the time...

My theory is that photographing was done for the making of new better maps. On the other hand Soviet Union carried out similar kind of job in Finland and for sure elsewhere too. These flights were called "ghost flights" in Finland and happened before Winter War. For example Lt. T. Huhanantti was about to crash with an unknown plane near Utti air base in 1938 (or 39?). That plane flew with all lights off and Finnish pilots believed that it would have been in secret duties. But was it a Soviet one? The Commander of FAF ordered that Huhanantti should admit that he saw nothing.

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AFAIK Soviet "Ghost flights" over Finland were common in 1934 and also just before WWII. There was a big trial against Finnish helpers (beacon maintenance) of these flights and it seems that this trial proved that the Soviet flights really had occured. However, I have only one source for this information: the book "Skuggan över Norden" by Valentin Sjöberg, that was written for political reasons, i.e. anti-bolshevism. Who knows of later and more objective sources?

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I don't think the fact that the cameras were manufactured by Zeiss is very relevant. Zeiss manufactured most if not of all cameras that Finns used for aerial photography. One type manufactured by Zeiss was designed by Nenonen's staff. Zeiss bought the patent.

It is an other matter if German officers have been present. Still I don't really see what possible benefit Finns could have had from the business. Being caught on a mission does not sound worth the trouble if the only beneficiary was a third power. German-Finnish relations were not the best possible in 1938 or 1939 either. There must be something more to it than has been mentioned in the references quoted here.

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I don't think the fact that the cameras were manufactured by Zeiss is very relevant. Zeiss manufactured most if not of all cameras that Finns used for aerial photography. One type manufactured by Zeiss was designed by Nenonen's staff. Zeiss bought the patent.

I thought Gen. Nenonen just invented the method of stereo photographing and Zeiss made the camera systems for that. I don't know any details so I may be wrong but this indicate that Finns and Germans co-operated in this sector already much before WW II.

It is an other matter if German officers have been present. Still I don't really see what possible benefit Finns could have had from the business. Being caught on a mission does not sound worth the trouble if the only beneficiary was a third power. German-Finnish relations were not the best possible in 1938 or 1939 either. There must be something more to it than has been mentioned in the references quoted here.

I didn't say "German officers" because officials Eskola met wore civil clothes but spoke German. It is also possible that these guys were not Germans.

Of course we Finns get these photographs too. It seems that another country partispated in these missions - perhaps financing them, supplying films and cameras etc. The primary reason for these flights was for sure mapping. Perhaps spying newest Soviet ships and aircraft (types and numbers) could be other reasons.

I don't think military relationships would have been as bad as political relationships. You forget that Gen. Halder visited in Finland in the summer 1938 (IIRC). Many Finnish officers visited in Germany for example Capt. "Eka" Magnusson (later Commander of Flying Squadron 24) who got to know interesting things on German air defence in 1938. Heinkel He 112 "cannon fighter" was demonstrated at Utti after that visit, but was fortunately not bought (it was a "sheep in wolf's clothes" according to Suomen Ilmailuhistoriallinen Lehti / Finnish Aviation History Magazine).

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This is a very interesting post. Thank you for posting it on this forum. I would like to give some more fuel to this discussion by asking some further questions. I hope you don't mind me doing this. The questions are:

a.) Did Finland have any naval intelligence surveillance stations along the Baltic Sea coastline and on the islands of Suursari, Seiskari and Laavansaari, from which it could easily monitoring the movements of the Soviet Baltic Fleet? I have read in some book some years ago that from the Finnish border town and famous sea resort before the war, TERIJOKI, today known as Zelenogorsk, you could very easily saw all the movements of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt and Sankt Petersburg?.

b.) If these aerial reconnaissance flights really happen, how come the Soviets were not aware of them? I mean the fact that someone could made twenty-three air missions unharmed over Kronstadt and Sant Petersburg, the second largest city in Soviet Union and the largest Soviet Naval Base in the Baltic, in such a tense time as it was 1939 is leaving me in some skepsis. Was either the Soviet air defence so badly manned and led or ..... Also, how come the Soviet spy, one Finnish officer in the Finnish headquarters did not introduce to the Soviets that such reconnaissance flights are being carried ourt over Soviet Union? Unless of course, if they were kept in absolute secrecy even in the Finnish Military Command.

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It would seem extremely risky to fly such missions over the very city whose security was used as the pretext for territorial demands on the Karelian Isthmus. If the Blenheim would have been shot down, it would have offered an immediate reason to attack, so the risks were politically high explosive.

On the other hand, Blenheim was a comparatively fast aircraft compared to Soviet fighters at that time (Polikarpov I-16), and obviously the missions were flown in a very high altitude to avoid detection visually or by sound. Apparently the weather had to be bright for good photographic resolution.

Air surveillance radar systems were not operative on the Soviet side then, so the Blenheim would have been revealed only with bad luck from an airborne Soviet fighter.

The number of missions, 23, sounds high. Do the sources give the reason for this? Was it perhaps "basic research" to determine a reference point regarding normal peacetime military activity, to be compared with troop concentrations later?

Are you quite sure about the name of the battleship above?

My bet is it's the "Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya", or October Revolution.

"Gangut" is an interesting story in itself. The Soviet / Russian naval history celebrates an unknown naval battle, "The Battle of Gangut", which few know about in the west. "Gangut" is actually the Russian way of pronouncing the Swedish "Hangö Udd", for "Hankoniemi" in Finnish. As far as I remember, The Imperial Russian Fleet had success in its waters against the Royal Swedish Navy sometimes in history. But I have not heard of "Gangut" given as a name to a warship.

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(I thought Gen. Nenonen just invented the method of stereo (photographing and Zeiss made the camera systems for that. I don't (know any details so I may be wrong but this indicate that Finns and (Germans co-operated in this sector already much before WW II.

Nenonen did not invent the method but he and his staff improved it a lot increasing the efficiency by 20 times compared to what it was before. This led to a situation where the army was mapping Finland 5 to 10 times faster than the civilian authorities.

Zeiss was not selected because it was a German company but because it was the best. And in some areas it still is. Some Japanese camera manufacturers still use lenses made by Zeiss because of their superior quality. So the fact that the equipment was "made in Germany" is not very significant.

What comes to the visits of German officers in Finland that was the policy German government followed in Finland. The more the diplomatic relationships deteriorated the more German foreign office used the inofficial channel that soldiers provided. Because of personal relationship between many Finnish and German officers it was relatively easy to get an invitation. German political goal was to prevent Finland becoming one of the Scandinavian neutrals. Those days both Germany and Russia allowed Finland only to choose side not to stay out. From Finnish point of view, the ministery of foreign affairs did not understand how the visits of German and western, especially British, military would be interpreted in Soviet Union. Obviously Berlin understood very well how the visits would be interpreted.

Wipert von Blücher's (German ambassador in Finland) comments that have been quoted in many history books are very revealing. He clearly saw how the German influence in Finland deteriorated towards the end of the 1930's and he did his best to slow down the process. Using visits of the military was one of the ways he recommended. He also tried other measures, like inviting Finnish artists to visit Germany. Unfortunatley Olavi Paavolainen's visit turned into a disaster from Blüchers point of view. As Blücher himself noted "ten years would not be enough to make good of the damage caused by Paavolainens book" (Kolmannen valtakunnan vieraana , Guest of the Third Reich).

Without more information I still find it hard to believe that FAF would have photographed Leningrad area on German account given the potential consequencies of getting caught. I don't doubt that Abwehr could well have received copies of the photos through some deal.

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a.) Did Finland have any naval intelligence surveillance stations along the Baltic Sea coastline and on the islands of Suursari, Seiskari and Laavansaari, from which it could easily monitoring the movements of the Soviet Baltic Fleet? I have read in some book some years ago that from the Finnish border town and famous sea resort before the war, TERIJOKI, today known as Zelenogorsk, you could very easily saw all the movements of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt and Sankt Petersburg?.

Well, not officially, but we could watch over all movements of Soviet Baltic Fleet. That was the main reason we lost Karelian Isthmus, these islands and submarines were forbidden for the Finnish Navy. Finns together with Estonians had solved the encrypting code of Soviet Baltic Fleet and could read their messages, so there was no need for observing.

All coastal batteries which could hit the sea routes to St. Petersburg and Kronstadt naval base were destroyed according to Tartu peace agreement in 1920. Also the islands of the Bay of Finland were unarmed.

Terijoki [Zelenogorsk] was not a town. There were only three towns in ceded areas: Viipuri [Vyborg], Sortavala and Käkisalmi [Priozjorsk].

b.) If these aerial reconnaissance flights really happen, how come the Soviets were not aware of them? I mean the fact that someone could made twenty-three air missions unharmed over Kronstadt and Sant Petersburg, the second largest city in Soviet Union and the largest Soviet Naval Base in the Baltic, in such a tense time as it was 1939 is leaving me in some skepsis. Was either the Soviet air defence so badly manned and led or ..... Also, how come the Soviet spy, one Finnish officer in the Finnish headquarters did not introduce to the Soviets that such reconnaissance flights are being carried ourt over Soviet Union? Unless of course, if they were kept in absolute secrecy even in the Finnish Military Command.

They just couldn't find/reach a fast flying single plane. The flying height was 6000 m which is quite high. Not all of these flights were directed to St.Petersburg. The whole coast from the border of Estonia, Karelian Isthmus and areas north from Lake Ladoga were photographed. And not all missions succeeded. IIRC at least once plane was about to crash when there was a failure in pilot's oxygen system. Plane crossed the border at low level and it was seen by Soviet soldiers. This occasion led to the exchange of notes between Finnish and Soviet border authorities.

I'm not quite sure if there were Soviet spy(s) in Finnish General Staff, more likely they worked in the Ministry of Defence. As a matter of fact even the Commander of Air Defence Maj.Gen. Jarl Lundqvist didn't know about these missions initially. The order came from the General Staff.

Perhaps our military authorities wanted to assure that there would have been no danger of amphibious assault against the southern coast of Finland. For us Soviet troop concentrations were of course vital information.


 
  
  
Aimo E. Juhola photographed Leningrad spewing Ack-Ack


Colonel (ret.) Jyri Paulaharju and war pilot, reconnaisscance pilot, airline captain Aimo E. Juhola brought the secret photographs out to the public. (Photo: Kari Rouhiainen)

Author: Juhana Lepoluoto
Originally published in the daily newspaper "Keskisuomalainen" on October 10, 1998.

The great Summer 1944 offensive preceded by a fateful screw-up by Finns

The Finnish aerial reconnaissance got early information on the attack deployment in the Carelian Ishtmus, but the photos were interpreted incorrectly.

Revealing photos of the Soviet attack preparations were taken early enough, but the information didn't reach the HQ.

The arguments whether Finnish planes operated in the Leningrad region during the Continuation War can be ended. On Thursday I shook hands with Air Force Captain Aimo E. Juhola in the Helsinki War Museum. He piloted a captured PE-2 in 1943, photographing the region all the way to the Town of Pähkinälinna. Photos taken by Juhola have survived, though all negatives had to be handed over to the allied Watch Commission.

- I flew in 8,500 meters (28,300 ft), Juhola told. - Leningrad had very strong air defences, and though the 76mm fire couldn't reach my altitude, the heavy guns could. It was not fun.

- Marshall Mannerheim forbade bombing of Leningrad but not photography, the expert of aerial recon, Colonel(ret) Jyri Paulaharju explained. Juhola and Paulaharju presented an extraordinary exhibit in the Museum, where doubly secret wartime photographs are displayed to the public for the first time.

The great revelation of the exhibit is that Finns had accurate photographs of the Soviet attack deployment already in the first days of June 1944. The information didn't travel right, and the attack came as surprise after all.

Aimo E. Juhola flew over Leningrad as a Warrant Officer, who had experience of recon piloting from the Winter War.

Colonel(ret) Jyri Paulaharju is all business, when giving detailed presentation of the unique exhibit in the War Museum on Maurinkatu, helsinki. The exhibit presents doubly secret material from the last wars. Interpreted aerial photos of the Soviet deployment shouldn't even exist, but there they are, valuable evidence of military history, for all the people to see.

When at the key group of photos, Paulaharju's voice gets a new edge:

- A disastrous screw-up was made here, the Colonel says. It is about recon flights, whose results were received in proper time, on June 3rd, to be evaluated by the artillery group of the 4th Army operating on the Isthmus.

The group began stereo examinations in order to pinpoint targets, but there was no cooperation between the artillery group and the operative intelligence of the Army. A report was sent to the HQ on the morning of June 8th, that five new heavy artillery sites had been found.

- Afterwards we have located over 200 Russian positions in the photos, Paulaharju states.

Captain Aimo E. Juhola, who worked as a recon pilot during both wars, shows what the photos taken on the crucial June 2nd and 8th are all about:

- In both series of photos you can see lots of artillery positioned close to the front. An attack can obviously be expected.

Recon already in peacetime

In addition to the crucial aerial photos, the exhibit shows essentially the whole history of Finnish aerial reconnaissance to the end of the war. There are even interpreted German photos of the Russian Baltic fleet from 1918.

With the increased international tension before Winter War, the Finns began recon flights over the neighbour. After all, Russian "ghost planes" used to circle in Finnish airspace all the time in the 1930's. In early spring of 1939, late Captain Armas Eskola of the 4th Flight Regiment received a top secret mission from the General Headquarters: his Blenheim was ordered to photograph the Soviet border. Eskola was comforted by stating that if something happens, no one will know of the pilot.

Aerial recon during the Winter War was hampered by poor English equipment and lack of light, but with new cameras, surveillance in the Continuation War fared much better. Aerial recon was joint operation: the stereo interpreter was often a trained Artillery officer.

The silent air war demanded victims, too.

- I wonder what was going on in the mind of the commander, who ordered a pilot to take a slow twin engine plane to photograph the great military harbour at Paldinsk, Aimo E. Juhola says.

Crate after crate of aerial photos

The allied Watch Commission, essentially the Soviet Union, demanded all intelligence material being handed over, including aerial recon photos.

According to Colonel Paulaharju, 32 railway carriages full of military maps and five carriages of aerial photo negatives were taken to Soviet Union in 1945.

Some photos were left in Finland, though. Kauko Kippo, a technician in the Air Force who used to work as chemigraphist(sp?) in "Keskisuomalainen" had collected aerial photos during the war. After his demise, his son Vesa gave the photos to the Military Archive.

By his superior's request, a Captain of the Artillery School had stored photos, and when retiring as an old Colonel he handed them to the Archive.

The Artillery department of the 3rd Army left a cache of eight crates of aerial photos, including German material.

- Back then you'd have gotten in serious trouble for hiding the aerial photos, says Paulaharju.


 

  
  
Additional information

The main theme of these articles is about the failure of Finnish intelligence to notice the build up of Soviet forces in spring and summer 1944 and to forecast the forthcoming Soviet offensive. The front line troops, the recon and fighter pilots, everyone in the front line knew there was an offensive brewing - but when it finally erupted in June 1944 it was a complete surprise to the Finnish high command.

The theories have been wild and various. Some HQ staffers have complained, that there was no reconnaissance information. No photos, no news, nothing. However the reconnaisscance pilots had been active and brought large numbers of photographic material showing the build up. Radio intelligence had been tracking the movements of Soviet forces very accurately. It just happened that the information was either scrapped, not believed and even didn't reach the HQ - because aerial photographs were "put into drawer" and not passed on because personal problems between various persons in the HQ.

An excellent article about one of the most renounced Finnish reconnaissance pilots was published in WWII Ace Stories, written by Ossi Juntunen.

Here's the direct link, Kullervo "Kude" Virtanen - The Recce Pilot.

Quote:

Virtanen was getting worried. Why did the enemy fighters not attack ? Most likely his Pe and the four Me's blended in with the dozens of other radar echoes on the enemy radar screens, and the enemy flight control was unable to direct the fighters to a target with unknown location. The Pe crew continued their mission under the mercifully inaccurate AA fire.

After they had been in the air for 90 minutes the observer announced that the target had been covered. Virtanen did not delay in turning to the North to leave the danger zone. The fighter escort soon left them, being low on fuel and having had nothing to do this time.

PE-215 landed at Lappeenranta where the ground crew was waiting to remove the film cassette. The valuable film was immediately sent for processing and analysis. The mission had been successful, the photos revealed the enemy troop and material concentrations, to be attacked by bombers and to be fired at by artillery. The timetable of the counterattack would be decided basing on information revealed from intercepted enemy radio messages. General Oesch (commanding the front) and Col. Lorenz (commander of the air force units at hand) sent their thanks to Virtanen and his crew.

Now PE-215 was in the air once or twice every day, weather allowing. On 1 July when they were photographing at Johannes/Lihaniemi area near Vyborg, the AA was particularly accurate, and also two La-5 tried to attack, only to be intercepted by the escorting two Me's. Next day four La-5 attacked the reconnaisance plane, again the escorting fighters took care of the intruders. Epilogue

During the next four weeks Virtanen and his crew flew a total of 27 missions, only three of which were interrupted due to technical problems of the camera or the aircraft engines, never by enemy action. Only once two photo runs were crossed due to heavy AA fire, but the photos were useful enough. The Finnish escort fighters were able to prevent all enemy fighters from attacking the PE-215.

Kude Virtanen and his crew were decorated for their excellent performance. The photos they took played an important part in thwarting the three successive final attacks of the Red Army at Ihantala, Viipurinlahti and Vuosalmi.

More information will be added here as supplied or pointed out by others. You may offer additional material through Jukka Kauppinen / jukka.kauppinen @ NOSPAM.jmp.fi
Credits

These articles were first published in the daily newspaper "Keskisuomalainen" on May 3, 2002 and October 30, 1998.
Published on these pages with the author's permission. Copyright 1998, 2002 Juhana Lepoluoto.

Translation to English language: Lt(jg) Markku Herd, Finnish Navy.

Photos:
Photos in "Aimo E. Juhola photographed Leningrad spewing Ack-Ack"
Kari Rouhiainen

Copyright VLeLv Icebreakers / Virtuaalilentäjät r.y. / Finnish Virtual Pilots Association 2003.

 

  

Viimeksi muokattu: 2003-10-23 13:14